

Bourdieu between Tents

Class and Leadership in the Lebanese October Revolution



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Table of Contents

| | |
|--|----|
| Introduction | 4 |
| Literature Review | 6 |
| SMT..... | 6 |
| Networks..... | 7 |
| Leadership..... | 9 |
| Networked Leadership..... | 11 |
| Identifying leadership | 13 |
| Class Analysis in Social movements..... | 15 |
| Bourdieu's uses | 16 |
| Methodology..... | 19 |
| The composition of LOR's leadership..... | 22 |
| Bourdieu in the Lebanese October Revolution..... | 26 |
| Conclusions | 28 |
| Bibliography | 30 |
| Appendices..... | 35 |

Introduction

Last year, in the evening of October 17, hundreds of people gathered in front of the Lebanese parliament in Beirut. They were demanding the derogation of a new set of taxes that would hit hard the already deprived Lebanese precariat and the shrinking middle classes. The day after, it was not hundreds but thousands those who converged in Riad al-Solh and other parts of Beirut's downtown. The tax reform was derogated but there was no going back. The chants of "*thawra*" ("revolution") or "*ash-shab yurid isqat an-nizam*" ("people want to bring down the regime") echoed through the streets. Replicating their Tunisian, Egyptian, or Syrian counterparts from the Arab revolts of 2010-2012. Those nights, the images of police clashing with protesters drew more attention and support for the mobilizations, which were demanding broader reforms, the end of the sectarian political system and its corrupted elites. The third night of protests, a group of women formed a human wall between police forces and the protesters. Many of the interviewees participated in this collective action. Perla Joe was one of them: "the third day of protests [after two violent nights] I jumped from group to group, telling to create this wall to stop any violence. At the same time, I saw many people doing the same. I hadn't had any contact with them, but they had the same idea". This is an example of alternative modes of leadership. This action changed the course of the Lebanese Revolution and set the tone for a nonviolent, long-term mobilization. Soon after, different political groups, other organizations and individuals were setting up tents in Riad al-Solh and Martyr's square. During these first weeks of protests, citizens occupied the streets and started different initiatives: talks, film nights, music stages, cleaning and recycling shifts, etc. Also online, social media accounts, such as *Daleel thawra* or *Megaphone* were created to inform and organize all the events related to the protests. At the same time, some people started to make a living by selling Lebanese flags, water bottles or snacks. After two weeks of economic halt, some economic activity resumed. Protest turnouts decreased. Protesters and activists changed their tactics: From massive manifestations in downtown to public-shaming politicians that were in bars or restaurants, and organizing protests in front of key institutions such as the Central Bank or Électricité du Liban.

The Lebanese October Revolution is an illustrative case study to bring back two concepts that have been lately neglected in social movement analyses: leadership and class. The own nature and structure of contemporary social movements, that have been defined as segmented networks, have changed the functions and implications of leadership.¹ These networked social movements, as Manuel

¹ Donnatella Della Rata, and Augusto Valeriani, "Remixing the Spring! Connective Leadership and Read-Write Practices in the 2011 Arab Uprisings," in *Communication Rights and Social Justice*, ed. Claudia Padovani and Andrew Calabrese (New York: Palgrave, 2014): 288-304.

Castells describes them, seem to be leaderless.² However, as seen above, the Lebanese revolution has been defined by certain actions. Protesters have learnt from the Arab uprisings and have taken initiatives. These are actions of leadership. This thesis explores the literature of critical leadership studies and social movement theory to define the nature of the leadership of the Lebanese revolution. To enrich this analysis, this paper will employ another concept largely forgotten in social movement studies: socioeconomic class. The development of the field in the 70s coincided with the post-war economic growth and the increasing concern for post-materialist issues, gender, sexuality, and identity politics.³ However, many scholars have argued for class and political economy to be brought back into the discussion.⁴ The notion of class is especially relevant for the Lebanese case. Lebanon is a very unequal country. Its Gini coefficient, which measures income distribution, is 50.7. It ranks at 129 from 141 countries in terms of equal distribution of income.⁵ According to the World Bank, a third of the Lebanese live under the poverty line.⁶ Furthermore, a cross-sectarian movement such as the Lebanese October Revolution, which is demanding the end of the sectarian system, is the finest case study to overcome traditional identity analyses of the Lebanese sociology.

With these two concepts in mind, this thesis explores how heterogeneous or homogeneous is the leadership of the Lebanese October Revolution. For that, it first surveyed the literature on these two concepts after introducing the field of Social Movement Studies. This review was pivotal for the second step: building a framework and methodology well-rooted in pertinent theories and perspectives within Academia. Third, using a Critical Leadership Studies framework, leadership was defined as collective action performed by people that gave their time, networks or ideas in a manner that was recognized by the movement itself as extraordinary.⁷ Following this definition, individuals that performed acts of leadership were identified and interviewed. These interviews and surveys with relevant activists and protesters were crucial to describe in qualitative terms the nature and structure of the Lebanese revolution's leadership during the first four months of the uprising. LOR's leadership

² Manuel Castells, *Networks of Outrage and Hope. Social Movements in the Internet Age*, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2012).

³ Terry Clark, and Seymour Lipset, "Are Social Classes Dying?" *International Sociology* 6, no. 4 (1991): 397-410.

⁴ Donatella Della Porta, *Social Movements in Times of Austerity* (Malden, Polity Press, 2015); Jasmine Kerrissey, and Evan Schofer, "Labor Unions and Political Participation in Comparative Perspective," *Social Forces* 97, no. 1 (2018); Adam Hanieh. *Lineages of Revolt: Issues of Contemporary Capitalism in the Middle East* (Publication place: Haymarket books, 2013).

⁵ Edwin Saliba, Walid Sayegh, and Talal F. Salman, "Assessing Labor Income Inequality in Lebanon's Private Sector," UNDP, 2017.

⁶ World Bank, "World Bank: Lebanon is in the Midst of Economic, Financial and Social Hardship, Situation Could Get worse," *World Bank*, November 6, 2019, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/11/06/world-bank-lebanon-is-in-the-midst-of-economic-financial-and-social-hardship-situation-could-get-worse>

⁷ Neil Sutherland, Christopher Land, and Steffen Böhm, "Anti-Leaders(hip) in Social Movement Organizations: The Case of Autonomous Grassroots Groups," *Organizations* 21, no. 6 (2014): 759-781.

was horizontal and collective, because there was no individual or group that took representative or decision-making responsibilities. In fact, there were no successful attempts to create any centralized cooperation committee, as it happened in other networked revolutions. Many activists pointed out to the ideological heterogeneity as a factor in blocking these attempts. Regarding structure, the Lebanese leadership is, as others, a network of networks, but with a small difference: networks showed very high and early levels of formalization due to two main reasons. First, the Lebanese Civil Society is large and very active. Second, many protesters have been actively engaged in social movements especially since the 'You Stink' protests in 2015. To describe the leadership's collectivity in material terms, this paper developed a framework based on Bourdieu's class theories. A survey about his three axes of capital was distributed among those who participated in the above-mentioned interviews. In these terms, the Leadership is relatively heterogeneous in economic aspects, like income levels or property. But very homogeneous when it comes to social capital (social connections) and cultural capital (education level). This economic heterogeneity might be problematic in pinpointing economic grievances as *the* mobilizing factor. Furthermore, that is not the aim of this paper but describing the leadership collectivity. LOR's leadership is formed by a group of highly educated individuals with strong social connections, but those cultural and social resources have not been always translated in high economic capital.

Literature Review

This literature review will survey three different concepts within the field of social movement studies (SMS) in the context of contemporary protests. First, it will approach the idea of networks to understand recent protests such as Indignados, Occupy Wall Street, Tahrir revolution, etc. This idea of networks is part of social movement theory but also it is intimately related to leadership. This would be the second concept analyzed, trying to see the historical evolution of the concept of leadership from a conventional perspective focusing on notions of charisma to a more critical conceptualization. Third, it will review the literature on political economy within SMS, developing the concept of class and surveying recent models of class analysis. Finally, all these concepts will converge in a survey of the academic works that study through a class perspective the contemporary protests' leadership.

SMT

To understand this thesis' ideas and concepts, it is necessary to study the evolution of social movement studies as a field. Social Movement Theory (SMT) was developed in Europe and the United States in the 1970s.⁸ It grew in contestation to a tradition of collective behavior that explained social movements and protests from a psychological perspective. Scholars such as Le Bon, Blummer or Gurr

⁸ John Chalcraft, *Popular politics in the making of the modern Middle East* (Cambridge University Press, 2016).

described protestors as irrational, deviant and psychologically disturbed.⁹ Social movement theorists tried to overcome this mechanistic perspective and developed a set of concepts that defined protestors as rational. They wanted to explain the gap between the grievance and action with an explanatory form based on three key concepts: mobilizing structures, or material capacity; political opportunities; cultural framing process, or narratives.¹⁰

However, this classical SMT has been criticized from two different angles. The first, its concepts are too descriptive, objective. As Chalcraft states, “these concepts do not get us very far”.¹¹ The problem here is that description is taken as an explanation. SMT concepts do not really engage in causal explanations. Its structuralism explains away processes of creativity, describing them away as results of one of the three concepts. The other critique focuses on classical SMT’s neglect of historical processes and power relations.¹²

In 2001, as a response to these critiques, especially the first one, a group of leading figures of SMT developed a new perspective on social movements: Dynamics of Contention (DOC). DOC describes contentious politics as continuous processes of re-interpretation. In these, they stress the flourishing of informal networks, creativity and improvisation. Objectivism is substituted by a focus on perception and attribution. The broader context in which movements interact is included by analyzing the “interpretations and actions of those outside the movement, and the role of elite collective action”.¹³

NETWORKS

The historical evolution of SMS as a field cannot be disassociated with that of the concept of networks. As social movements studies evolved in the 1970s, scholars of the field used this analytical tool to explain recruitment capacity, *mobilizing structures*, or even to define social movements as such.¹⁴ Most of the scholars of the field of social movements engage and contribute constantly to the literature on networks. As Diani and McAdam mention, “[t]hat collective action is significantly shaped by social ties between prospective participants is not a recent discovery, [...] nor is the view of social movements as networks linking a multiplicity of actors”.¹⁵ This relationship SMS-networks became

⁹ Gemma Edwards, *Social Movements and Protest* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982).

¹⁰ Chalcraft, *Popular Politics*, 20.

¹¹ *Ibid*, 21.

¹² *Ibid*, 21.

¹³ *Ibid*, 22.

¹⁴ Nick Crossley, and Mario Diani. "Networks and fields," in *The Wiley Blackwell companion to social movements* ed. David Snow *et al.* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2018): 149-166.

¹⁵ Mario Diani, and Doug McAdam, *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1.

more concrete when Charles Tilly adopted the concept of 'catnets' from the sociologist Harrison White.¹⁶ Catnets, from 'categories' and 'networks', is based in two features. First, "whether the members of groups objectively had connections with each other, and whether they understood these connections to give them sufficient commonality upon which they could base collective action".¹⁷ This idea resembles Thompson's constructivist Marxist approach to class consciousness and highlights the importance of shared cultural aspects, shared stories and meaning.¹⁸ However, the inclusion of networks in SMT neglected the cultural aspects during those years. Researchers focused more on aspects of recruitment,¹⁹ diffusion, leadership and brokerage, and on organizational forms.²⁰

In 2003, Mario Diani and Doug McAdam,²¹ in their book *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*, collected the progress made in the field of networks for social change in the previous decades. Furthermore, they state that the concept of network - in relation to social movements - has been overstretched so much, that it became a tautology. That is to say, networks and social movements became the same thing. They suggest that what is important is to answer 'how networks matter' for individual participation and for inter-organizational dynamics. At the same time, they say, this ambiguity or *flexibility* makes of networks a perfect conceptual tool for the study of change. Furthermore, they acknowledge three main reasons for its recent popularity in the field of social movements. First, networks analysis helps in locating the relation of the individual with broader social patterns. It helps in answering the everlasting dilemma between agency and structure. Second, networks analysis neglects law-like theories and it relies more on explanations based on social mechanisms.²² In this sense, this focus on processes and 'episodes', as the authors of *Dynamics of Contention* put it. The third reason is the emergence of "social network analysis as a distinct field in social science".

Ten years later, John Krinsky and Nick Crossley, in a special issue on social movements studies and social networks, analyzed the literature of the field in a thematic way. For them, researchers did not focus on *how* ties of networks are created -cultural and identity perspectives-, but "treated the analysis of social networks in ways that emphasize certain types of tie, and the strength of those

¹⁶ Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading: Addison/Wesley, 1978).

¹⁷ John Krinsky, and Nick Crossley, "Social Movements and Social Networks: Introduction," *Social Movement Studies* 13, no. 1 (2014): 1-21.

¹⁸ E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, London: Victor Gollancz, 1963.

¹⁹ David A. Snow, Louis A. Zurcher, Jr. and Sheldon Eklund-Olson, "Social Networks and Social Movements: A Microstructural Approach to Differential Recruitment," *American Sociological Review* 45, no. 5 (Oct 1980): 787-801.

²⁰ Krinsky and Crossley, "Introduction"

²¹ Diani, and McAdam, *Relational Approaches*.

²² *Ibid*, 4.

ties”.²³ This focus led researchers into analyzing questions of repertoire change, organizational structures, recruitment, power, leadership, diffusion and brokerage. These last four terms are closely related to the ideas of leadership that the next section will deal with. As Krinsky and Crossley mention, “the analysis of networks is often geared toward understanding the ways in which actual social interactions result in situations of unequal power”.²⁴ In the same way, in the new networked social movements, the roles of diffusion and brokerage acquired increasing relational prominence and power.

LEADERSHIP

Classic conceptualizations of social movement leadership emerged from the Weberian ideal types of legitimacy of sovereignty: traditional, charismatic or rational-legal, bureaucratic sources. Especially from the last two. In any of these cases, leadership is understood here as an authority structure or personality type. It ignores leader’s behavior²⁵ or the relationship between leaders and followers. These are seen as “giving themselves up to a charismatic leader and therefore lacking agency”.²⁶ Social movement scholars absolutely rejected these ideas of irrational followers and, eventually, charisma “was effectively ‘banished’ from the subfield”.²⁷ However, it came back with Bob Clifford and Sharon Nepstad’s study of the assassination of leaders’ movements and the different consequences between the murders of ‘prophetic’ leaders versus administrative leaders. However, “these categorizations do not tell us much about the factors that make people compelling and capable organizers”.²⁸

In their recent *Bringing Leadership Back*,²⁹ Marshall Ganz and Elizabeth McKenna identified two principal ideas whose interaction and contention are still relevant in the subfield of social movements leadership. These are Robert Michels’s “iron law of oligarchy”³⁰ and Jo Freeman’s “tyranny of structurelessness.”³¹ Michels’s theory of political leadership understands that followers give away their agency to their leaders. They do this because of apathy or lack of competence. They accept leaders representing them. However, this has shortcomings. These leaders, as they obtain power,

²³ Krinsky and Crossley, “Introduction”, 3.

²⁴ *Ibid*, 5.

²⁵ Marshall Ganz, and Elizabeth McKenna, “Bringing Leadership Back In,” in *The Wiley Blackwell Companion to social movements* ed. David Snow et al. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2018), 187.

²⁶ Alberto Melucci, *Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 336.

²⁷ Ganz and McKenna, “Bringing Leadership Back In,” Marshall Ganz, and Elizabeth McKenna, “Bringing Leadership Back In,” in *The Wiley Blackwell Companion to social movements* ed. David Snow et al. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2018), 187.

²⁸ Bob Clifford, and Sharon Nepstad, “Kill a Leader, Murder a Movement? Leadership and Assassination in Social Movements,” *American Behavioral Scientist* 50, no. 10 (May 2007, quoted in *Ibid*, 187.

²⁹ *Ibid*.

³⁰ Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (New York: Collier Books, 1911).

³¹ Jo Freeman, “The Tyranny of Structurelessness,” *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 17 (1972): 151-164.

become political elites who develop distinctive interests directly in conflict with their follower's.³² This theory received numerous critiques from the subfield, alleging that there are organizational forms that avoid these problems of oligarchy by engaging in democratic, cooperative decision-making.³³ However, recent studies have pointed out to the active pursuit of anti-hierarchical forms of organization in recent mass mobilizations to revive this debate.³⁴ In 1972, Freeman was the first one in making the distinction between authority structures and the exercise of leadership. Not only that, she described how in apparent "structureless" and "leaderless" organizations, informal leadership and power relations emerge, without the need to hold official power.³⁵ According to Ganz and McKenna, these tensions are unresolved. For them, it "demonstrate[s] why researchers must carefully assess group structure and leadership practices as separate but interdependent dimensions of a social movement".³⁶ A similar question was posed by Aldon Morris and Suzanne Staggenborg fourteen years earlier than Ganz and McKenna. Apparently, the subfield is at the classic impasse between agency and structure. As they wrote in 2004, "the relative neglect of leadership in social movement theory results from a failure to adequately address the importance and limitations of both structure and agency".³⁷ In their words, they describe leadership as liquid, relational, contingent:

Leaders operate within structures, and they both influence and are influenced by movement organization and environment. They are found at different levels, performing numerous and varied functions. Leaders sometimes pursue their own interests and maintain organizations at the expense of movement goals, but different organizational structures produce different types of leaders, including some who work to advance movement goals over their own interests. Different types of leaders may dominate at different stages of movement development and sometimes come into conflict with one another.³⁸

Perhaps, the question here is not where to place leaders between agency and structure, but to reconsider the whole notion of leadership. Neil Sutherland *et al.*'s article of the "anti-leaders(hip)" turn in Social Movement Organizations employ a critical perspective on leadership for their analysis of autonomous grassroots movements. Critical Leadership Studies (CLS) understands leadership as a relational, socially constructed rather than attributing leadership to certain individuals with skills, behavior or traits. Before their analysis, they reviewed the literature of social movement leadership. For them, the scarce studies on the matter still employ a conventional perspective on leadership. That

³² Aldon D. Morris, and Suzanne Staggenborg, "Leadership in Social Movements," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* ed. David Snow *et al.* (Malden: Blackwell, 2004): 171-196.

³³ *Ibid*, 172.

³⁴ Ganz and McKenna, "Bringing Leadership Back In," 189.

³⁵ Krinsky and Crossley, "Introduction", 5.

³⁶ Ganz and McKenna, "Bringing Leadership Back In," 189.

³⁷ Morris and Staggenborg, "Leadership in Social Movements," 173.

³⁸ *Ibid*, 174.

is to say, they maintain the assumption that leadership comes from an individual, rather than from a “process enacted by a multitude of organizational members”.³⁹ From the CLS perspective, the two key points are: leadership is a shared activity that creates social meaning. Even if “specific actors take the lead” in a specific moment and are able to define other people’s realities, this definition and meaning “must be shared [...] and valued” by the collective before actions are taken.⁴⁰ By neglecting any kind of leadership, latent power relations might generate hierarchical relations. To avoid the “tyranny of structurelessness”, they suggest, it is important to acknowledge that leadership will exist without leaders. But, if leadership is understood in a critical way, organizations will be able to adapt to collective meaning-making leadership. Total or partial notions of this critical perspective on leadership are used in the following section’s theories on kinds of leadership in contemporary social movements.

NETWORKED LEADERSHIP

Past sections have reviewed the theoretical evolution of the concepts of social networks and individual leadership. The ideas exposed above have influenced the articles and theories of this section, which will deal with more recent definitions of leadership in the context of contemporary protests.

One of these first theorists was Paolo Gerbaudo. Right after the wave of protests of 2011, he developed a conceptualization of leadership that could be settled in between the self-definitions of the movements as leaderless and an academic skepticism shaped by Freeman’s “tyranny of structurelessness”. As he mentions, thanks to new technologies of communications, activists believe in a “swarm intelligence” in which “no one is a leader because everyone is a leader”.⁴¹ This discourse clashes with the identification of certain individuals or groups who exercise a “pivotal role” in the mobilizing, sustaining and initiating protests.⁴² First, he defined this wave of protests as displaying liquid organizations. He argues, in this liquid organizations, communication and organizations “become almost indistinguishable. [...] Individual activists rather than groups are seen as the basic units of the movement”.⁴³ As opposite to orders or collective action points, individual activists communicate and influence action. Although the use of social media allows for broad participation, inevitably there will be individuals that exert greater influence and reach. This is what Gerbaudo calls “soft leadership”, since “the communicative and organizational work they conduct through Facebook and Twitter amounts to a form of leadership, as a relatively centralized influence on the unfolding of

³⁹ Sutherland *et al*, “Anti-Leaders(hip) in Social Movement Organizations,” 762.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 763.

⁴¹ Paolo Gerbaudo, “‘Follow Me, But Don’t Ask Me to Lead You!’: Liquid Organising and Choreographic Leadership,” in *Tweets and the Streets: Social Media and Contemporary Activism*, ed. Paolo Gerbaudo (New York: Pluto Press, 2012), 134.

⁴² *Ibid*, 135.

⁴³ *Ibid*, 136.

collective action". "Choreographic leadership" is largely indirect and invisible, it is based on soft and emotional influence to create a collective sense and a direction.⁴⁴

For Simon Western, this term fails to describe the fluid and plural leadership of these movements. Their "leadership operates as an emergent process, not as scripted or choreographed from behind the scenes".⁴⁵ He describes the same problem as Gerbaudo but in more CLS terms. As protesters reject the idea of individual leadership, scholars tend to describe a "decaffeinated leadership."⁴⁶ He suggests the concept of Autonomist leadership and outlines five main defining principles: Spontaneity, leadership arises and disappears without stabilizing in any actor; autonomy, leadership can be taken by everybody or nobody; mutualism, leadership is enacted by mutual consent, mutual responsibility; networks, instead of classical leadership that utilized networks, leadership is embedded within fluid, dispersed networks;⁴⁷ affect, personal affective investments draw individuals to these movements, at the same time, these movements also generate collective affects.⁴⁸

Beyond these abstractions, different scholars have attempted to generate a more concrete categorization of leadership in these protests. Bakardjieva *et al.*, in their study of different Canadian social movements, identified three types of roles that were performed by outstanding contributors to the movement. First, the organic intellectual leadership which is usually observable by the higher level of influence of their ideas.⁴⁹ The adjective 'organic' is drawn from Gramsci. The organic intellectual does not obtain their authority from professional positions but from their origin within oppressed social groups. Their goal is to deconstruct the hegemonic ideologies that oppress their group of origin.⁵⁰ Second, the sociometric star and the bridge. This role is very related to the notion of centrality in networks analysis. The agent is at the center of the network, well-connected. In a social media environment, this role is usually taken by *influencers* or personalities with great popularity. Third, the caretaker. These actors invest more time and energy in the movement's goals. This axis of leadership captures "an important feature of network movement leadership: its performative character"⁵¹ because leadership is not appointed or granted. Leaders stand out for what they do. In social

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 157.

⁴⁵ Simon Western, "Autonomist Leadership in Leaderless Movements: Anarchists Leading the Way," *Ephemera Theory & Politics in Organization* 14, no. 4 (2014), 687.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 686.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 681.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 682.

⁴⁹ Maria Bakardjieva, Mylynn Felt, and Delia Dumitrica, "The mediatization of leadership: grassroots digital facilitators as organic intellectuals, sociometric stars and caretakers," *Information, Communication & Society* 21, no. 6 (2018): 899-914.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 905.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, 911.

movements in which everyone but nobody has the final responsibility, those who take immediate action are exercising leadership.

Billur Özgül also differentiates three styles of leadership in her analysis of the Egyptian protests.⁵² These are soft, hybrid and experienced leaders. The experienced leaders, as she explains, are the Egyptian activists that acquired experience in mobilizing and organizing protests and other social movements prior to the Arab uprisings in 2011. The knowledge, tools and networks they obtained then made them ideal types to lead the movements in the ground. They acted as traditional leaders. They relied on face-to-face, offline and conventional communication. They contacted offline sectors of society and organized the protests on the streets. Soft leaders were mainly social media accounts' moderators. They created collective identities and decided on the framing processes. At the same time, they built online networks, increasing the movement's reach nationally and internationally. Lastly, hybrid leaders. These leaders acted sometimes as a connector between the other two. Other times they acted as both: social media administrators were sometimes present on the ground during the assembly meetings. As well, some experienced activists also had taken the role of soft leaders in the preparation of the mobilizations. As well, hybrid leaders also made use of their online tools, they acted as "mobilizers", inspiring online watchers to participate in the ground.

Identifying leadership

These two categorizations do not engage in any way with a critical perspective on leadership. Although they understand leadership as acted and give great importance to the 'soft' leadership of meaning-making, they replicate mainstream leadership assumptions: they place leadership in individuals in a static manner. However, this thesis will make use of versions of these categorizations, since it will need to identify acts of leadership in the Lebanese protests, but it will maintain a critical leadership standpoint.

Both theories, although drawn from very different case studies –Özgül's analyzed the Arab revolutions, and Bakardjieva *et al*'s, Canadian grassroots social movements– described leadership as acted and highlighted three levels of leadership which almost mirror each other. In both categorizations there is a kind of leader concerned with soft power, ideas or meaning-making. Bakardjieva *et al* named it *organic intellectual*, and Özgül, *soft leader*. For Özgül, these leaders are embodied in social media administrators. This kind of leadership is concerned mainly with two tasks: the creation of a collective identity among the protesters, and the movement's discourse. As Özgül, explains, the administrators of the Facebook page *Kullena Khaled Said* (we are all Khaled Said) framed

⁵² Billur Özgül, *Leading Protests in the Digital Age: Youth Activism in Egypt and Syria* (Cham: Palgrave, 2020).

the discussion in non-ideological terms.⁵³ These ways of selling the movement are, in Bakardjieva *et al.*'s words, the organic intellectual's ways. They described individuals whose ideas resonate greatly in the collective, producing a common identity. They are 'discourse producers', as defined by Bourdieu: professionals trying to sell their "political products" and their views of the world.⁵⁴ In this sense, both the *organic intellectual* and *soft leaders* are marketers of ideas and collective identity. In both definitions, the importance of online communication is paramount. Both categorizations exemplified this type as social media administrators.

At first sight, some of these individuals, such as social media administrators, bloggers or journalists could be confused with a different Bakardjieva *et al.*'s category, the *sociometric star and bridge*. Of course, these categories' divisions are blurred and temporal. As Western explains in his *autonomist leadership* theory,⁵⁵ certain individuals can perform one type of leadership at the beginning of the protests and a different one on a later phase. Or all of the types simultaneously. However, if you boil down Bakardjieva *et al.*'s definition, the usefulness of the sociometric star is their ability to connect. It is obvious that the bigger the number of followers, the greater their capacity to connect different networks. However, in that sense, more connections are not immediately better than the connection of key, strategic networks within a movement. In this case, Özgül's *hybrid leaders* performed a vital role in connecting the online and offline networks and, more importantly, connecting politically-engaged citizens with those who were less interested in politics before the uprisings. On the same note, these *hybrid leaders* are also mobilizers. As they connect the online and offline realms, they tend to mobilize their online networks into offline manifestations.

The third type of leadership is called *caretaker* by Bakardjieva *et al.*, and *experienced leader* by Özgül. Even though both definitions are very different, they can be reduced to those individuals that invest or have invested more time and energy in the movement or organization than the average participant. This definition is very close to Bakardjieva *et al.*'s *caretaker*. These leaders, either online or offline, get things done. They are always present. In that sense, Özgül's *experienced leader* is a slightly different definition. Those leaders are experienced activists more active among offline networks. However, their added value is not only the time they have invested, but also the knowledge, legitimacy, and networks acquired after years of activism. We find a dilemma here. Özgül is highlighting a kind of leadership that clashes with a CLS perspective. Somehow, this leadership is statically possessed by an individual. At the same time, Özgül is valuing years of activism that would be omitted if a CLS perspective, which focuses on the spontaneous and sporadic character of

⁵³ Özgül, *Leading Protests in the Digital Age*, 81.

⁵⁴ Bakardjieva *et al.*'s, "The Mediatization of Leadership," 906.

⁵⁵ Western, "Autonomist Leadership", 681.

leadership, is applied. How to accommodate these two perspectives? The problem here is that Özgül's three categories were divided along the offline-online axis. Those who act in the online realm, those who act in the offline one, and those who connect the former two. The different tasks these leaders perform are only a consequence of the realm in which they act. But not the defining character. The fact that the first two categories have a very clear task to perform is just accidental.

I suggest a slightly different way of conceptualizing these categories according to what leaders *give* to the movement rather than what their task is. This approach does not depart far from their theories. CLS perspective, Özgül, and Bakardjievaa *et al* understand leadership as performed. These acts of leadership are defined in comparative terms: their ideas resonate in a "higher degree",⁵⁶ they invest more time, they connect more networks. The idea here is that leaders give more to the movement than the average participant: either ideas, networks or time. This understanding of leadership accommodates long-term activists' added-values and fits into the CLS perspective outlined by Western. It is spontaneous, leaders arise and disappear as they add something valuable to the movement; autonomous, everybody has the potential to take this role, regardless of the time they have been involved in the movement; mutual -and very important for my methodology-, there is a collective recognition. A person might invest loads of hours on the movement, but if it is not recognized and accepted by their peers, it is not a performance of leadership. For this reason, leadership depends on networks. It is, in fact, given by the network. Going back to Özgül's appreciation of experienced activists, these activists, after having invested their time in the movement, they develop networks and recognition, which will facilitate the advancement of their ideas. In Bakardjievaa *et al*'s, these long-term activists become better bridges and organic intellectuals.

CLASS ANALYSIS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Marxist, historical materialist perspectives on social movements have a long tradition. Economic grievances and class movements have been historically some of the engines of contentious politics. John Chalcraft, in his book *Popular Politics: In the Making of the Modern Middle East*, surveyed the literature of this tradition in the MENA region. Names such as Beinun, Batatu or Halliday understood contentious episodes in the region through the Marxist terms of capitalist forms of accumulation or class consciousness.⁵⁷

A political economy perspective on social movements has been rare until lately.⁵⁸ Due to the over-representation of identity-based contentious politics and the post-materialist demands of the

⁵⁶ Bakardjievaa *et al*, "The Mediatization of Leadership," 906.

⁵⁷ Chalcraft, *Popular Politics*.

⁵⁸ Donatella Della Porta, "Political Economy and Social Movement Studies: The Class Basis of Anti-Austerity Protests," *Anthropological Theory* 17, no. 4 (2017), 454.

wave of social protests since the 1970s,⁵⁹ many scholars are demanding to bring back political economy into social movements studies, especially after the anti-austerity social movements after 2011. Della Porta explained how these protests mobilized people hit by neoliberal policies and claimed that scholars should add Marxist analysis of structural conditions to understand the forms in which these mobilizations express discontent with neoliberalism.⁶⁰ On the same vein, Adam Hanieh analyzed the Arab uprisings of the last decade to end up with a similar response: previous Neoliberal reforms exacerbated the precarity of the middle-eastern working classes and the shrinking middle classes.⁶¹ So, the uprisings were not a response to too much 'red tape' -bureaucracy and regulations- but a response to the neoliberal advances in the Arab countries.

More specifically, the concept of class has experienced a radical expansion in the last years.⁶² Despite "[t]he multiplication of roles and professions and of the related stratifications,⁶³ Academia has been "catching up" and have "brought the lived experience of working-class people to the fore".⁶⁴ Now I will present very briefly how different class analysis models have been trying to "catch up" with this increasing complexity. In this sense, Erik Wright's book *Approaches to Class Analysis* is a perfect suit, since it aims at clarifying the different theoretical traditions of class analysis and their understanding of class. In his volume, six authors present the analytical foundations of six different perspectives: Marxist, Weberian, Durkheimian, Bourdieuan, rent-based, and a post-class perspective.⁶⁵

Bourdieu's uses

Among the above-mentioned theories, Bourdieu's understanding of class has been a principal actor in what Mike Savage described as the "rise of class analysis in British Sociology."⁶⁶ In his article, he explains how the class models of scholars such as John Goldthorpe or Paul Willis became obsolete amid processes of de-industrialisation and neoliberal fragmentation of social relations in the UK after 1970.⁶⁷ During this decline, British scholars abandoned the collective notion of class for more individualistic approaches. The very same Goldthorpe –among others– developed the Nuffield class

⁵⁹ Barry Eidlin and Jasmine Kerrissey, "Social Class and Social Movements," in *The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* ed. David Snow *et al.* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2018): 517-536.

⁶⁰ Della Porta, *Social Movements in Times of Austerity*.

⁶¹ Hanieh, *Lineages of Revolt*.

⁶² Colin Barker, Laurence Cox, John Krinsky, and Alf Gunvald Nilsen, *Marxism and Social Movements* (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2013), 28.

⁶³ Della Porta, "The class basis of anti-austerity protests," 458.

⁶⁴ Barker *et al.*, *Marxism and Social Movements*, 29.

⁶⁵ Erik Olin Wright, *Approaches to Class Analysis* (Cambridge University Press, 2005).

⁶⁶ Mike Savage, "The Fall and Rise of Class Analysis in British Sociology, 1950-2016," *Tempo Social* 28 no. 2 (2016): 57-72.

⁶⁷ John Goldthorpe, "Intellectuals and the working class in modern Britain," in *Social stratification and economic change* ed. David Rose (London: Hutchinson, 1988); Paul Willis, *Learning to Labour* (Farnborough, Saxon House, 1975).

schema.⁶⁸ A system in which class was defined by the nature of employment: unskilled or skilled manual labor, service workers, higher-grade technicians.⁶⁹ This turn, although praised as pragmatic and “scientific” at that moment,⁷⁰ abandoned underpinning assumptions of earlier class theories. It understood classes as gradational instead of relational – and foregone any ideas of domination or exploitation between classes. Nevertheless, class analysis in British Academia was bound to come back after 2000. Mainly for three different reasons: growing inequality in the country, popular concern about class, and growing interests in “granular” rather than large scale class analyses.⁷¹

In this context, Bourdieu’s ideas became very influential in British sociology. First, because it did not use extensively the notion of class, therefore, detaching himself from obsolete Marxist theories. Secondly, instead of focusing on the working class as a force of social change –which was an unfulfilled prediction of the previous class theories–, he focused on the upper classes and explained this unfulfilled prophecy arguing that the working classes were “disorganized [...] due to their lack of capitals”.⁷² Thirdly, it solved the “paradox of class” –as inequality increases in a country, people’s class self-identification or ‘class consciousness’ declines– by using the idea of misrecognition: elite’s power naturalized unequal social relations: “as inequalities are ‘naturalised’ as the product of differing amounts of motivation, skill, or natural ability, they might not be registered as class inequality”. Fourth, Bourdieu defined class in a more fluid manner, not as a fixed entity but as a contingent outcome of other mechanisms, such as capitals, habitus and fields.⁷³

In an earlier book, Savage identified the main strengths of Bourdieu’s theory. First, its understanding of class as a long-term inequality that is inherited; secondly, his perception of class as constructed by three types of capital. Here, capital is understood as ‘pre-emptive rights over the future’.⁷⁴ Economic capital is the most straight-forward of the three. It involves properties, savings or any other monetary asset. However, for Bourdieu, this economic inequality is supplemented by other types of inequalities. Cultural capital here is defined as educational qualifications and habitus – understood as the engrained set of habits or skills belonging to a certain class. Well-educated parents pass on their children the *higher possibilities* to succeed at educational systems and obtaining degrees and, thus, better jobs in the future. In the same manner, they pass upon them routines and

⁶⁸ John Goldthorpe, Chelly Halsey, Anthony Heath, John Ridge, Leonard Bloom, Lancaster Jones, *Social mobility and class structure in modern Britain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).

⁶⁹ Chelly Halsey, Anthony Heath, John Ridge, *Social mobility and class structure in modern Britain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), quoted in Roger Penn, “The Nuffield System Categorization,” *Sociology* 15 no. 2 (May 1981): 265-271.

⁷⁰ Savage, “The Fall and Rise of Class Analysis,” 63.

⁷¹ *Ibid*, 66.

⁷² *Ibid*, 66.

⁷³ *Ibid*, 67.

⁷⁴ Mike Savage, *Social Class in the 21st Century* (Penguin Books, 2015), 42.

mannerisms that might imply higher social status and, thus, opening more possibilities. This is a perfect example of how any kind of capital can be translated ultimately to power –or ‘rights over the future’ to use Bourdieu’s words. Lastly, Social capital. Bourdieu understood that social networks affect people’s life chances. Once again, these connections can be translated into information, job opportunities or resources.⁷⁵

Bourdieu’s theory became dominant to define class divisions in the UK after 2003. According to Savage, The Cultural Capital and Social Exclusion project was the “most rigorous replication of Bourdieu’s work since his own”.⁷⁶ As he explains, there was a growing body of scholarship using Bourdieu’s perspectives. Works such as Will Atkinson’s *Class, individualization and late modernity* or Li et al.’s *Social mobility and social capital in contemporary Britain*.⁷⁷ One of the most relevant attempts of class analysis in the last years: the BBC’s Great British Class Survey has also applied Bourdieu’s perspective. With questions about social connections, income, property, and tastes. The survey divided the UK into seven different groups using the three axes proposed by Bourdieu: elites, established middle class, technical middle class, new affluent workers, traditional working class, emergent service sector, and precariat. Another example of Bourdieu’s uses, in this case about social movement, is Betsy Leondar-Wright’s book *Missing Class*. In it, she establishes the importance of locating activists in their class cultures to understand better microinteractions within social movements. For her analysis, she also applies the three axes of capital. She weights education and occupation level, taking into consideration home-ownership and employment. But she misses income since income brackets are not social classes and they fluctuate over a typical life span, a decision well-rooted in the long-term definitions of Bordieuan class.⁷⁸

Most of these Bourdieu’s uses fall into what Magne Flemmen described as “cultural class analysis”. These perspectives, much like British sociologists between the 1970s and 2000s, are driving their concerns away from two traditional notions of class: first, the relations of power between classes, and, secondly, the context of capitalist market relations in which these happen.⁷⁹ According to him, class cannot be reduced simply to the distribution of capital or gradational relations between classes. In a later article, Savage *et al.* would respond to this critique: they do acknowledge processes of

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 46.

⁷⁶ Savage, “The Fall and the Rise of Class Analysis”, 68.

⁷⁷ Yaojun Li, Mike Savage, and Alan Warde, “Social Mobility and Social Capital in Contemporary Britain,” *The British Journal of Sociology* 59 no. 3 (September 2008): 391-411; Will Atkinson, *Class Individualization and Late Modernity: In Search of the Reflexive Worker* (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 2011), as quoted in Savage “The Fall and the Rise of Class Analysis”, 68.

⁷⁸ Betsy Leondar-Wright, *Missing Class: Strengthening Social Movement Groups by Seeing Class Cultures* (Cornell University Press, 2014).

⁷⁹ Magne Flemmen, “Putting Bourdieu to Work for Class Analysis: Reflections on some Recent Contributions,” *British Journal of Sociology* 64 no. 2 (2013): 325–43.

accumulation in capitalist market societies and argue that theirs is not a simply relational approach: “accumulation takes the form of the sequestration of rents”. Thus, certain economic class, with their higher access to capitals, will have greater chances of capital accumulation.⁸⁰ Bourdieu applied a very broad notion of class understood as strata, and their novel vocabulary helped to update class analyses to contemporary societies. Although more interested in cultural aspects than their predecessors, Bourdieu’s theory is still a relevant theoretical tool to analyze economic classes and social stratification of a society or, in my case, of a social movement. In the upcoming chapter, I will outline a methodology rooted in the theory cited and reviewed in this chapter.

Methodology

This methodology had two steps since I tried to answer two related questions: first, what is the nature and structure of LOR’s leadership? Secondly, and my thesis question, how heterogeneous is this leadership in terms of social class? To answer the first question, this paper has developed in the previous chapter a definition of a leader. In short, a leader is any person that performs an act of leadership, defined as giving one’s time, ideas or networks to the movement in a manner that is accepted by the movement itself as extraordinary because it surpasses the average participation. The main problem with this definition is that leadership is *perceived* and depends on collective acceptance. The Lebanese October Revolution is, as any networked popular movement, a very heterogeneous network, in fact, a network of networks. As I will argue, leadership is based on finding a partial acceptance from key actors from multiple networks.

For that, I decided to analyze both offline and online activities for it would yield richer results. Following the example of Bakardjieva *et al.* I relied first on first-hand observation and historical analysis to select participants, I continued “through snowball sampling as participants recommended other individuals with significant contributions to the movement”.⁸¹ However, as my research begs for heterogeneity within the pool of participants. I could not rely entirely on this method. I also enriched this first pool of participants with activists from an organizations’ list gathered by *Daleelthawra.com*. A “revolutionary directory” that became the place-to-go for protesters to get informed of activities, protests and needs of the revolution. Furthermore, I actively included participants that performed different activities – political talks, recycling, arts, or music stages. On the online realm, I focused on Instagram and Twitter. I selected the most popular accounts (either personal or collective) that posted with the tags of #Thawra or #ثورة and #Lebanon, #Lubnan or #لبنان

⁸⁰ Mike Savage, Fiona Devine, Niall Cunningham, Sam Friedman, Daniel Laurison, Andrew Miles, Helene Snee, and Mark Taylor, “On Social Class, Anno 2014,” *Sociology* 49 no. 6 (2015): 1011-1030, 1017.

⁸¹ Bakardjieva *et al.*, “The Mediatization of Leadership,” 904.

between the months of March and November. I chose to focus on the first months of the revolution because it is at the beginning of the movements when leadership arises.⁸² This first wave of 24 participants were mainly activists from different groups present in the revolution, plus some very relevant individuals on Instagram and Twitter, such as artists and journalists. This pool of participants is not perfectly representative, I acknowledge that the 'snowball' method tends to overweight certain networks within the social movement over others, and that the fact that I am not fluent in Arabic, overweighed those individuals who spoke English and French. Nevertheless, accounting for these biases, the pool is formed by a wide range of individuals, present in offline and online realms and performing different kinds of activities.

Through semi-structured interviews (Appendix 1) of over 45 minutes of length I obtained qualitative information about the interviewees' role in the movement. In the appendixes, transcripts of the interviews can be found (Appendix 4 Online). These are not comprehensive since I did type down what I considered relevant. After that, I sent a survey to those who fitted into my leader's description and accepted to be questioned about their economic situation. A total of 17 participants answered this questionnaire.

The survey's questions are drawn from two different latent class analyses. First, the Great British Class Survey (GBCS) whose methodology is explained in Savage et al.'s *A New Model Of Social Class?*⁸³ Their method is complemented by Leondar-Wright's in *Missing Class*.⁸⁴ My aim here is to create a questionnaire to categorize, within my material limitations, each participant according to the three Bordieuan capitals: cultural, social and economic. For social capital, I opted to amplify the GBCS model. In the current online British survey, they ask if you "know socially" a set of 18 occupations: from secretary to Shop Assistant and Chief Executive based on CAMSIS categorization.⁸⁵ However, I could not survey people about the full CAMSIS list for pragmatic reasons, so I selected a list of 28 professions by clustering different occupations into one (Appendix 2). There are some concerns with this method. First, how to address cases of unemployment or multiple jobs? Secondly, where and how to draw the limits of "knowing socially" a person? I asked the interviewees to only include those with whom have had or have more or less recurrent interactions. In the case of unemployment, the last main

⁸² Gerbaudo, "Follow Me, But Don't Ask Me to Lead You!", 141.

⁸³ Mike Savage, Fiona Devine, Niall Cunningham, Mark Taylor, Yaojun Li, Johs. Hjellbrekke, Brigitte Le Roux, Sam Friedman, and Andrew Miles, "A New Model of Social Class? Findings from the BBC's Great British Class Survey Experiment," *Sociology* 47 no. 2 (2013): 219-250.

⁸⁴ Leondar-Wright, *Missing Class*, 34

⁸⁵ "The Great British class calculator: What class are you?," Class Calculator, BBC, accessed May 8, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-22000973>

occupation would count as such, following the CAMSIS instructions.⁸⁶ These occupations were rated from 1 to 7 according to the CAMSIS subgroups. The initial idea was that participants could score from 1 – If they did not know anyone – to 28, if they knew someone from every occupational group. However, there were some further problems regarding this question. Many participants ticked all the options, while others selected only two of them. Probably due to the subject interpretation of what “knowing socially” means. For that reason, I decided to not standardize the results. Since it yielded incomparable results.

The second capital surveyed was cultural capital. This time I followed Leondar-Wright’s system and surveyed participants about their highest year of Education and their parents’ (I only counted the highest of the two).⁸⁷

Table 1: Educational level

| | | | |
|---|------------------------------------|---|--------------------|
| 7 | Master’s degree or higher | 3 | Intermediate Level |
| 6 | University Level | 2 | Elementary Level |
| 5 | Technical or Vocational Institutes | 1 | Non-Schooled |
| 4 | Baccalaureate Certificate | | |

Lastly, Economic capital was measured following the GBSC methodology. They assessed household income, household savings and house price and standardized it. To provide a scale from one to seven again, I used the progressive income tax brackets of the Lebanese Budget Law No. 144 dated 31/07/2019.⁸⁸ This scale, however, only accounts for household income. To include assets such as savings or properties, another scale was formed according to their asset’s variation from the average house price in Beirut. This is \$519,991 according to a real estate market study carried out by the Lebanese Bankmed in 2017.⁸⁹ This created another scale in which participants could score from 1 to 7. This question also had certain limitations and subjectivities. As some activists pointed out, their economic relationship with their parents is not clear. Many of them live on their own but with some help from their parents. Others live with their parents but do not contribute much to the parents’

⁸⁶ “The non-working population,” Accessing and using CAMSIS scale scores, CAMSIS, accessed May 8, 2020, <http://www.camsis.stir.ac.uk/useofscores.html>

⁸⁷ “Appendix 1: Survey instrument,” Missing Class Tables, Figures and Appendices, Classism, accessed May 9, 2020, <https://classism.org/missing-class-tables-figures/>

⁸⁸ “Executive Summary of the Budget Law No. 144 dated 31/07/2019 (Budget 2019),” Lebanon, Aldic, accessed May 9, 2020. <http://www.aldic.net/%E2%80%A8executive-summary-of-the-budget-law-no-144-dated-31072019-budget-2019/>

⁸⁹ Wissam Moubarak, “Opinion: Lebanon’s real estate market remains buoyant outside Beirut,” *Arabian Business*, August 28, 2018. <https://www.arabianbusiness.com/real-estate/403218-lebanons-real-estate-market-remains-buoyant-outside-beirut>

economy. The definition of household in quasi-emancipated individuals made difficult to draw lines of property and savings. Ultimately, this assets category was not included in the analysis.

Table 2: Economic capital scale

| | Income Brackets | | Assets (Savings and properties) | |
|---|--|---|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1 | Less than \$4,000* a year | 1 | Negative variation of more than 25% | \$0 (no property or savings) |
| 2 | More than \$4,000 and less than \$10,000 | 2 | Negative variation of more than 50% | Between \$0 and \$250,000 |
| 3 | More than \$10,000 and less than \$20,000 | 3 | Negative variation of more than 25% | Between \$250,000 and \$375,000 |
| 4 | More than \$20,000 and less than \$40,000 | 4 | Average house price of \$519,991 | Between \$375,000 and \$625,000 |
| 5 | More than \$40,000 and less than \$80,000 | 5 | Positive variation of more than 25% | Between \$625,000 and \$750,000 |
| 6 | More than \$80,000 and less than \$150,000 | 6 | Positive variation of more than 50% | Between \$750,000 and \$1,000,000 |
| 7 | More than \$150,000 a year | 7 | Positive variation of more than 100% | More than \$1,000,000 |

*LBP to USD conversion was done by applying the official rate during 2019: 1,500 LBP to the dollar.

The composition of LOR's leadership

The leadership of the Lebanese October Revolution follows similar patterns found in previous social movements such as those of the Arab uprisings or the anti-austerity protests in Europe and the US. LOR could have been defined as leaderless, as these were.⁹⁰ All of the interviewees agree: there are no individuals or collective that hold a prominent position of representation or decision-making. The motto “everyone is a leader” was repeated several times during the interviews.⁹¹ Beyond that base agreement, discrepancies arise. Some of the participants believe that the lack of a unified leadership is the consequence of the nature of a heterogeneous movement in the context of a heterogeneous society like the Lebanese one. Some of these activists do not reject the idea of a unified, centralized leadership, like many horizontal movements of this kind did.⁹² And, in fact, some believe this would be a positive turn for the whole movement. “Leaders need time, now they are appearing. We want these leaders to unite [us] [...]. Because in the country, [political] parties are splitting us”, explains Tarek Hmaiden, founder of *Thawra TV*, an online platform broadcasting live videos of the protests and other activities related to the revolution. It is important to mention that the interviews took place in

⁹⁰ Manuel Castells, *Networks of Outrage and Hope. Social Movements in the Internet Age*, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2012).

⁹¹ Paolo Gerbaudo, “‘Follow Me, But Don’t Ask Me to Lead You!’: Liquid Organising and Choreographic Leadership,” in *Tweets and the Streets: Social Media and Contemporary Activism*, ed. Paolo Gerbaudo (New York: Pluto Press, 2012), 134

⁹² *Ibid*, 1.

May and June of 2020. In a moment in which the initial ecstasy and momentum had decreased due to the mere trace of time and the lockdown imposed to contain the spread of Covid-19. In this context, different political groups were shifting towards more long-term political projects of representation or collective proposals that claim to encompass all the protesters' demands.⁹³

On the other hand, some participants showed anti-leadership stances. Perla Joe, an artist that has been referred to as the guardian of the Revolution,⁹⁴ rejects these labels: "now we can have our own voices, being our own leaders.[...] I do not like when they put someone over me, so I guess people do not like when they put leaders over them." The political movement *Li-Haqqi* was among the first groups of people that went in front of the parliament in the afternoon of October 17th. Since then, they have attained relevance and, as Alaa Sayeg, one of its members, mentions, they were successful in influencing a certain direction within the movement. They actively tried to maintain a horizontal, collective leadership. "We pushed inside *thawra* (revolution) to decentralize to movement and spread it to regions outside Beirut". In the same vein, they rejected any kind of shift towards a centralized leadership, in contrast with the Egyptian revolution, in which a "Revolutionary Youth Coalition" was formed. The Lebanese revolution, although there were some attempts for centralized cooperation, did not reach higher levels of coordination beyond some meetings and WhatsApp groups.

Therefore, the Lebanese revolution showed greater and earlier discrepancies in relation to their leadership than the Indignados in Spain or Occupy Wall Street. In some of these cases, like in the Spanish one, there was a general anti-leadership standpoint that later crystalized into a more formal representation (in the form of the political party Podemos in Spain).⁹⁵ In the Lebanese example, there were earlier splits between those who wanted a centralized figure or group and early elections, and those who pushed for a more horizontal, decentralized leadership. This split was caused by a unique characteristic of the movement in Lebanon, especially in Beirut.

From the very first week, Riad al-Solh and other revolutionary places in Downtown Beirut were packed with tents managed by different collectivities that existed prior to the revolution or that were born out of it. This "formalization" process refutes Gerbaudo's thesis when he states that atomized

⁹³ Lebanon Citizens Bill of Rights, 2020. "Lebanon Citizens Bill of Rights' Facebook Page," Facebook, June 1, 2020. <https://www.facebook.com/lebanonbillofrights/>

⁹⁴ Gilles Khoury, "Perla Joe Maalouli, Gardienne de(s) But(s) de la revolution," *L'Orient Le jour*, December 8, 2019. <https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1197841/perla-joe-maalouli-gardienne-des-buts-de-la-revolution.html>

⁹⁵ Eduardo Romanos, "Late Neoliberalism and Its Indignados: Contention in Austerity Spain," in *Late Neoliberalism and its Discontents in the Economic Crisis*, ed. Donatella Della Porta, Massimiliano Andretta, Tiago Fernandes, Francis O'Connor, Eduardo Romanos, and Markos Vogiatzoglou (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 131-167.

individuals in constant communication form these movements.⁹⁶ In Beirut, there was an early tendency to formalize different groups of friends or even strangers into different organizations with name, social media accounts, logo and even organizational structures. One of these movements was *Minteshreen*, this group of friends and strangers met in the protests and after some informal meetings and collective actions they came up with the collectivity.

Hussein, one of its members, explains this phenomenon. “The first days of the revolution were full of NGOs and political parties that were not in the [political] system. Everything started in 2015 with the You Stink movement”. Hussein is referring here to a notion of continuous activism. Opposed to the idea that described the Arab Uprisings as the Arab Spring, as if there was no trace of activism or political engagement in the region prior to 2011. The uniqueness of the Lebanese revolution is that, as many activists mentioned, it started even before October 17th. Some of the interviewees mention the collective actions that sprung to combat the wildfires that devastated areas of Mount Lebanon the week before October 17th.⁹⁷ Some others refer to the protests that erupted on October 4th for a shortage of gas and dollars.⁹⁸ However, this phenomenon is not unique to Lebanon for it has been present in most of the networked revolutions. Nevertheless, there are endogenous characteristics in Lebanon that made them prone to this early formalization. Taymour, another member of *Minteshreen*, notices how the sectarian system made Lebanese people inclined to be part of collectivities. Many of the activists mentioned that the revolution erased clientelist identifications. This vacuum of collectivity was filled up by *thawra* collectivities. However, why did they take such a formal structure so early?

The answer to this question is equally important to describe the leadership of the Lebanese October Revolution in Beirut. I argue that the Lebanese society was engaged (at least formally) in social, environment or political organizations in a greater degree than the Egyptian or Tunisian societies. The World Values Survey carried out in these three countries shows so (table 3). Lebanese people participate in any kind of organization ten times more than Tunisian and 40 times more than Egyptians. Furthermore, there are 244 Egyptian NGOs listed at the directory arab.org while there are

⁹⁶ Gerbaudo, “Follow Me, But Don’t Ask Me to Lead You!”, 136.

⁹⁷ Timour Azhari, “Lebanon wildfires: Hellish scenes in mountains south of Beirut,” *Al Jazeera*, October 15, 2019. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/hellish-scenes-wildfires-engulf-lebanon-191015191252866.html>

⁹⁸ Michal Kranz, “Protesters rise up as Lebanon’s leaders grapple with multiple economic crises,” *Al Monitor*, October 4, 2019. <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/10/lebanon-protests-economic-conditions-central-bank-government.html#ixzz6OIQoSjxT>

784 in Lebanon. That means 46 times more NGOs per million people in Lebanon than in Egypt (the difference with Tunisia is way smaller – 0.3 more NGOs per million people).⁹⁹

Table 3: Membership (active or inactive) of different types of organizations (%)

| Survey Question | Lebanon | Tunisia | Egypt |
|---------------------------------------|---------|---------|-------|
| Religious Organizations | 22.3 | 1.6 | 0.8 |
| Sport or recreation | 26.2 | 5.5 | 0.3 |
| Art, music, educational | 24 | 3.9 | 0.3 |
| Labor Unions | 17.2 | 1.9 | 0.3 |
| Political parties | 22.2 | 1.7 | 1.3 |
| Environmental Organizations | 16.1 | 0.8 | 0.3 |
| Professional Organizations | 17.2 | 1.8 | 0.4 |
| Charitable/humanitarian organizations | 20.8 | 0.8 | 0.5 |
| Consumer Organizations | 12.8 | 0.4 | 0 |
| Mutual Aid groups | 17 | 0.4 | 0.3 |

World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014. Selected samples: Egypt 2013, Lebanon 2013, Tunisia 2013.¹⁰⁰

The Lebanese were more engaged with formal organizations. This reality pointed out by interviewees and by data, is intimately connected to one of the characteristics of the leadership of LOR in Beirut. A great majority (about three quarters) of the interviewees for this research had been active in past protests in Lebanon, NGOs, political parties or students' associations before the October Revolution. Going back to Özgül's three categories:¹⁰¹ among the Lebanese leadership, there is an overrepresentation of experienced activists. People that were part of or acquainted with these activist networks before October 2019. This conclusion is in line with John W. Cleveland's Young Adult Nucleus (YAN) thesis when he says that the leadership of today's social movements are formed by either politically-socialized young adults (under 30s) or older people that "have pursued a life-long 'activist career'".¹⁰² As we will see in the next section (Figure 1), most of the interviewees were between 25 and 44 years old. It is noticeable that there were not participants younger than 24 years old. Which follows Cleveland's theories. These younger individuals were not as relevant as their older

⁹⁹ "Arab NGO Directory," Arab.org, accessed June 7, 2020, <https://arab.org/directory/>

¹⁰⁰ Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin, and, B. Puranen et al. (eds.). *World Values Survey: Round Six - Country-Pooled Datafile 2010-2014* (Madrid: JD Systems Institute, 2013). <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp>

¹⁰¹ Özgül, *Leading Protests in the Digital Age*.


¹⁰² John W. Cleveland, "Does the New Middle Class Lead Today's Social Movements?," *Critical Sociology* 29, no.2 (March 2003) 173

counterparts in activists' networks. This phenomenon is also extended to participation. As Marc Lynch states, debunking the myth that the Arab Uprisings were solely a youth movement.¹⁰³

Bourdieu in the Lebanese October Revolution

As mentioned in the methodology, this section follows Bourdieu's three different capital axes: cultural, social, and economic capital to describe the activists that participated in the research along those axes. This is by no means a comprehensive analysis of the leadership of LOR, but the sample still offers enough general patterns to draw certain conclusions. As we can see from Figure 1, participants were very well-educated. Practically all of the interviewees had a Master's degree. They all belonged to the 46.3% of the Lebanese population that went to University.¹⁰⁴ The fact that they were better educated than their parents is not surprising. According to a UNDP report, most of the Arab youth is better educated than previous generations.¹⁰⁵ However, it is notable the heterogeneous cultural background of the participants, although there is a tendency towards participants whose parents (at least one of them) have higher education diplomas.

Figure 1: Age, Education levels, and economic assets of the participants



¹⁰³ Marc Lynch, *The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in The Middle East* (Columbia University Press: New York, 2014), 10.


¹⁰⁴ Mazen Soueid, Stephanie Ghanem, Ziad Hariri, Nadine Yamout, Rita Nehme, "Analysis of Lebanon's Education Sector" (BankMed, 2014).

<http://www.databank.com.lb/docs/Analysis%20of%20Lebanon's%20education%20sector.pdf>

¹⁰⁵ UNDP, *Arab Human Development Report 2016: Youth and the Prospects for Human Development in a Changing Reality* (Beirut, UNDP, 2016). <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/2699/ahdr2016en.pdf>

Regarding Social capital, there is less homogeneity among the participants, but yet again a strong, general trend can be found. As observed in the figure 2, participants are very well socially-connected with occupational groups considered of higher status by the CAMSIS scale. Occupations such as journalists, writers, artists, architects, engineers, University professors and researchers were among the most ticked groups. Every participant had ties with these high-status professionals. This shows that activists were part of social networks that could be translated into resources or opportunities when needed.¹⁰⁶ It is also noticeable that, after these high-status jobs, the most common ties are with pink-collar service-oriented jobs (hairdressers, waiters, housekeepers) and that primary and secondary sector professions are almost inexistent (with the exception of the farmer/fishermen category). Nevertheless, this imbalance might be caused by the prominence of the tertiary sector in the Lebanese economy. Service Sector represents 70% of the Lebanese GDP. The most important sectors are commerce, tourism and financial services. While agriculture and Industry constitute 10% and 20%, respectively.¹⁰⁷ It is reasonable to expect more connections among these kinds of jobs due to their higher presence in the economy overall.

Figure 2: % Participants that stated having social connections with this occupational groups.




¹⁰⁶ Savage, *Social Class*, 46.

¹⁰⁷ "The Economy," The Embassy of Lebanon, accessed June 8, 2020. <http://35.196.40.84/the-economy.html>

In terms of economic capital, the leadership becomes even more heterogeneous. There are participants in every income tax bracket, except in the highest one. It is difficult to draw any strong conclusion from this data. However, if we compare participants' distribution along the tax brackets with that of taxpayers (Figure 3), we can observe a general pattern. According to a 2017 UNDP report, most of the taxpayers are in the two bottom sections of the progressive tax.¹⁰⁸ 56.8% of the population makes less than \$10,000 a year. Furthermore, this data only accounts for sections of the formal economy. This percentage would be higher if we were to include those people chronically unemployed or informal labour (in Lebanon it is estimated that around half of the jobs are informal).¹⁰⁹ There is a problem with this comparison. I surveyed the participants about their household's income whereas the UNDP report refers to individuals' taxpayers. Taking this into account, this distortion might not be very big since both taxpayer's and household's average annual incomes are very similar: \$14,846¹¹⁰ and \$13,004, respectively.¹¹¹ Despite these limitations, data shows that the leadership's economic capital is slightly higher than the average Lebanese but shows great levels of heterogeneity, with a relevant portion of participants earning more than \$80,000 a year, another group closer to the national average, and a good number of participants whose annual income is lower than \$4,000.

Figure 3: Distribution along Income Tax Brackets



Conclusions

The leadership of the Lebanese October revolution can be described as a network of multiple networks and it is another example of what Castells called "networked movements"¹¹². However, there are certain peculiarities in the Lebanese October Revolution. First, their high levels of ideological heterogeneity regarding leadership and movement's goals stopped any relevant central cooperation attempt. Second, most of the leadership of LOR were already acquainted with or part of activist or political networks which were activated and accelerated after the 17th of October. This caused earlier

¹⁰⁸ Edwin Saliba, Walid Sayegh, and Talal Salman, *Assessing Labor Income Inequality in Lebanon's Private Sector: Findings, Comparative Analysis of Determinants, and Recommendations* (UNDP Fiscal Policy Advisory and Reform Project at the Lebanese Ministry of Finance, 2017), 5.

¹⁰⁹ Roberta Gatti, Diego F. Angel-Urdinola, Joana Silva, and Andrés, "Striving for Better Jobs: The Challenge of Informality in the Middle East and North Africa," (Washington: World Bank Group, 2014), 9.

¹¹⁰ Saliba et al., *Assessing Labor Income Inequality*, 5.

¹¹¹ Byblos Bank, "Lebanon This Week," *Economic Research & Analysis* 339 (January 2014), 5

¹¹² Castells, *Networks of Outrage and Hope*.

and greater levels of formalization among the revolutionary groups. This contradicted Gerbaudo's ideas that these movements are orchestrated by atomized individuals.¹¹³ The Lebanese leadership was not an orchestrated, but more an organic, fluid phenomenon. Simon Western's notion of 'autonomist leadership' suits better. His ideas of collective, horizontal and fluid leadership can be applied to LOR.¹¹⁴ Furthermore, despite no central cooperation, a common recognition existed between these groups, which resembles one of the principles of mutualism described by Western.¹¹⁵ No individual or group monopolized representation or decision-making but numerous individuals or groups raised as leaders in specific moments. These leaders led by actions or relevant ideas. These characteristics are common to past networked movements, such as 'Indignados' in Madrid or The Egyptian revolution in Tahrir square. When Bourdieu's three capitals are applied, even with such a small sample of the population, there is enough evidence to describe the leadership of the October Revolution as homogenous in social and cultural resources but economically heterogeneous. A larger sample might have shed even greater heterogeneity, especially if biases in selecting participants are corrected. But we can conclude that their high levels of cultural and social resources have not been always translated into economic resources. However, because of this economic heterogeneity, it would be wrong to conclude that economic grievances are the main reason for the paramount involvement of the participants in the movement. Nevertheless, finding mobilizing factors is beyond the scope of this thesis. Further research would be needed to address this topic. However, one of this thesis's goals was constructing enough theoretical justification for the application of two concepts that only now are regaining relevancy in the field of Social Movement Studies: Leadership and Class. This new recognition happened after years of neglect due to the rise of post-materialist social movements¹¹⁶ and the 'leaderless' label attached to the recent revolutions.¹¹⁷ Although this thesis' theoretical choices were relevant and suitable, I acknowledge certain limitations in the methodology itself and their application. Corrections in further research using this approach would be very welcomed. Nevertheless, the description of the Lebanese October Revolution using their leadership and Bourdieu's theories is an important first insight into a very recent phenomenon.

¹¹³ Gerbaudo, "Follow Me, But Don't Ask Me to Lead You!", 136.

¹¹⁴ Western, "Autonomist Leadership", 687.

¹¹⁵ Western, "Autonomist Leadership", 687.

¹¹⁶ Clark, and Lipset, "Are Social Classes Dying?"

¹¹⁷ Castells, *Networks of Outrage and Hope*.

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Appendices

APPENDIX 1: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS ABOUT LEADERSHIP

Interviewees had been previously informed about the goal and scope of the project.

1. Do you want to use a pseudonym?
2. Could you tell me something about your role on the protests?
3. Were you more active online or offline?
4. If you were part of a group with a tent in Downtown Beirut, where was it located?
5. Which kind of activities did you organize?
6. What does it mean for you leadership? To be a leader?
7. And in the context of a Social revolution like the Lebanese one?
8. What do you think of the following definition of leadership for a social movement?
9. *A leader is any person that performs an act of leadership, defined as giving one's time, ideas or networks to the movement in a manner that is accepted by the movement itself as extraordinary because it surpasses the average participation.*
10. Do you feel you fit into this definition? Why/why not?
11. What kind of trade you gave to the revolution? Time/ideas/networks
12. Why do you think your peers/me decided that you might have been a leader for the revolution?
13. Would you like to mention the extraordinary participation of any person of the movement that feel it should be recognized?
14. Would you mind to fill in a survey asking about your household's economic situation? It would be totally anonymous and only used for research purpose.

APPENDIX 2: SIMPLIFIED OCCUPATIONAL SCALE

| | | Figure indicates male CAMSIS scale scores using 'microclass' units ¹¹⁸ |
|---|-------------------------------------|---|
| 7 | Jurists | 1101. Jurists |
| | Doctors or dentists | 1102. Health professionals |
| | University professors or scientists | 1103. Professors and instructors |
| | | 1104. Natural scientists |
| | | 1105. Statistical and social scientists |
| | Architects or engineers | 1106. Architects |
| | Accountants | 1107. Accountants |
| | Journalists, writers or artists. | 1108. Journalists, authors, and related writers |
| | 1109. Engineers | |
| 6 | Officials, government or non-profit | 1201. Officials, government and non-profit organizations |
| | Managers | 1202. Managers |
| | | 1203. Commercial Managers |
| | | 1204. Building managers and proprietors |
| 5 | Systems analysts and programmers | 1301. Systems analysts and programmers |
| | | 1302. Aircraft pilots and navigators |
| | | 1303. Personnel and labor relations workers |
| | School teachers and librarians | 1304. Elementary and secondary school teachers |
| | | 1305. Librarians |

¹¹⁸ Dave Griffiths, and Paul Lambert, "Dimensions and Boundaries: Comparative Analysis of Occupational Structures Using Social Network and Social Interaction Distance Analysis," *Sociological Research Online* 17 no.2 (June 2012), 22.

| | | |
|---|---------------------------------------|---|
| | | 1306. Creative artists |
| | | 1307. Ship officers |
| | | 1308. Professional, technical, and related workers, n.e.c. |
| | | 1309. Social and welfare workers |
| | <i>Workers in religion</i> | 1310. Workers in religion |
| | | 1311. Nonmedical technicians |
| | Nurses and midwives. | 1312. Health semi-professionals |
| | | 1313. Hospital attendants |
| | | 1314. Nursery school teachers and aides |
| 4 | Real estate, insurance agents | 3101. Real estate agents |
| | | 3102. Other agents |
| | | 3103. Insurance agents |
| | Cashiers | 3104. Cashiers |
| | Shop assistants | 3105. Sales workers and shop assistants |
| | | 3201. Telephone operators |
| | | 3202. Bookkeepers and related workers |
| | Secretaries | 3203. Office and clerical workers |
| | Postal workers | 3204. Postal and mail distribution clerks |
| 3 | | 4101. Craftsmen and kindred workers, n.e.c. |
| | | 4102. Foremen |
| | Repair workers, electricians | 4103. Electronics service and repair workers |
| | | 4104. Printers and related workers |
| | | 4105. Locomotive operators |
| | | 4106. Electricians |
| | | 4107. Tailors and related workers |
| | Vehicle mechanics, painters, plumbers | 4108. Vehicle mechanics |
| | | 4109. Blacksmiths and machinists |
| | | 4110. Jewelers, opticians, and precious metal workers |
| | | 4111. Other mechanics |
| | | 4112. Plumbers and pipe-fitters |
| | | 4113. Cabinetmakers |
| | Bakers, butchers, | 4114. Bakers |
| | | 4115. Welders and related metal workers |
| | | 4116. Painters |
| | | 4117. Butchers |
| | | 4118. Stationary engine operators Bricklayers, carpenters & related |
| | | 4120. Heavy machine operators |
| 2 | Truck drivers | 4201. Truck drivers |
| | | 4202. Chemical processors |
| | | 4203. Miners and related workers |
| | | 4205. Food processors |
| | Textile workers | 4206. Textile workers |
| | | 4207. Sawyers and lumber inspectors |
| | | 4208. Metal processors |
| | | 4209. Operatives and kindred workers, n.e.c. |
| | | 4210. Forestry workers |
| | | 4301. Protective service workers |
| 1 | | 4302. Transport conductors |

| | |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Guards and watchmen | 4303. Guards and watchmen |
| Waiters or Baristas | 4304. Food service workers |
| | 4305. Mass transportation operators |
| | 4306. Service workers, n.e.c. |
| Hairdresser | 4307. Hairdressers |
| Deliverymen | 4308. Newsboys and deliverymen |
| | 4309. Launderers and dry-cleaners |
| Housekeeping, cleaners | 4310. Housekeeping workers |
| | 4311. Janitors and cleaners |
| | 4312. Gardeners |
| Fishermen, Farmers | 5101. Fishermen |
| | 5201. Farmers and farm managers |
| | 5202. Farm laborers |
| | 9990. Members of armed forces |

APPENDIX 3: ECONOMIC SURVEY

1. What is your age?

| | |
|-------------|----------------|
| a. Under 18 | b. 18 to 24 |
| c. 25 to 34 | d. 35 to 44 |
| e. 45 to 54 | f. 55 to 64 |
| g. 65 to 74 | h. 75 or older |

2. What is the last grade of school you completed?

| | |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| a. Non-Schooled | b. Elementary School |
| c. intermediate Level | d. Baccalaureate Certificate |
| e. Technical or Vocational Institutes | f. University Level |
| g. Master's degree or higher | |

3. What was your parent's highest grade of school completed?

| | |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| a. Non-Schooled | b. Elementary School |
| c. intermediate Level | d. Baccalaureate Certificate |
| e. Technical or Vocational Institutes | f. University Level |
| g. Master's degree or higher | |

4. Which of these people do you know socially? (multiple answer)

| | | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Jurists | Doctors or dentists | University professors or scientists | Architects or engineers |
| Accountants | Journalists, writers or artists. | Officials, government or non-profit | Managers |
| Systems analysts and programmers | School teachers and librarians | Workers in religion | Nurses and midwives. |
| Real estate, insurance agents | Cashiers | Shop assistants | Secretaries |
| Postal workers | Repair workers, electricians | Vehicle mechanics, painters, plumbers | Bakers, butchers, |
| Truck drivers | Textile workers | Guards and watchmen | Waiters or Baristas |

| | | | |
|-------------|-------------|------------------------|--------------------|
| Hairdresser | Deliverymen | Housekeeping, cleaners | Fishermen, Farmers |
|-------------|-------------|------------------------|--------------------|

5. What was the yearly income of your household during the first months of the revolution (October, November, December)? (I know it is unreal now, but if you have to convert it, do so using the back-then official rate of 1,500 LBP a dollar, I know, I know, it hurts)

| | |
|--|---|
| a. Less than \$4,000 a year | b. More than \$4,000 and less than \$10,000 |
| c. More than \$10,000 and less than \$20,000 | d. More than \$20,000 and less than \$40,000 |
| e. More than \$40,000 and less than \$80,000 | f. More than \$80,000 and less than \$150,000 |
| g. More than \$150,000 a year | |

6. What was the approximate value of your household's assets at the end of 2019 (during the first months of the revolution, October, November and December)? (include savings, properties and other assets such as company shares. Use if needed, the back-then official rate of 1,500 LBP)

| | |
|--|--------------------------------------|
| a. \$0 (I do not own my property or do not have savings) | b. Between \$0 and \$250,000 |
| c. Between \$250,000 and \$375,000 | d. Between \$375,000 and \$625,000 |
| e. Between \$625,000 and \$750,000 | f. Between \$750,000 and \$1,000,000 |
| g. More than \$1,000,000 | |

APPENDIX 4 (ONLINE)

Transcripts of the semi-structured interviews about Leadership.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/17A3QuQeX96bTGwxL-dFiAN5Eo_7a_E4B/view?usp=sharing

Appendix 5 (ONLINE)

Data set with answers from the interviews (under the sheet 'Leadership interviews') and the economic survey ('Economic survey' sheet)

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Gf58zyMKA6hZ674A15-714xuLIMBQm0b/view?usp=sharing>